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As a consequence of global changes to trade policy, there are likely to be significant 
impacts on international agricultural trade.  Clearly producers in the European Union 
(EU) will experience considerable changes to the structure of their industry, and for a 
country such as New Zealand, heavily dependent on agricultural exports, changes to 
policy and markets have the potential to significantly affect the economy.  The 
potential competition from China in terms of agricultural commodities as well as its 
potential as an export destination for NZ are also important considerations. This 
paper presents an analysis of the impact of both World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform in the agricultural sectors of the EU, 
New Zealand, and China.  The analysis covers the livestock sectors of these 
countries.  The model used for this analysis is the LTEM (Lincoln Trade and 
Environment Model).   
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 Introduction 
 
Agricultural trade policy is undergoing a series of changes in recent years, and 
European Union (EU) agriculture in particular.  Continuing from the Uruguay Round 
of reforms, Article 20 of the Agriculture Agreement committed members to begin 
negotiations on continuing the reform at the end of 1999. The World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) reforms are now well under way, using Article 20 as their basis.  
The November 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration sets a new mandate by making the 
objectives more explicit, building on the work carried out so far, and setting 
deadlines (WTO 2004). 
 
The negotiations are in the “modalities” phase at present, from November 2001, at 
the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar.  The declaration 
reconfirms the long-term objective already agreed in Article 20:  to establish a fair 
and market-oriented trading system through a programme of fundamental reform.   
Members have committed themselves to negotiations aimed at improving market 
access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of exports subsidies; and 
substantial reductions of trade distorting domestic support.  
 
Additionally, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Europe is and will be 
undergoing a number of reforms, particularly regarding dairy quotas and intervention 
prices of dairy products (OECD 2004).   Another important change occurring in the 
area of international trade is China‟s accession to the WTO.  This is likely to have 
impacts on markets around the world, as well as China itself.   
 
This paper reviews the current WTO round of negotiations, the CAP reforms, and a 
background of China‟s accession to the WTO.  Following this review, the impact of 
current proposed changes in EU policy, as well as broad WTO commitments in both 
the EU and China, are simulated using the LTEM (Lincoln Trade and Environment 
Model).  The impact of these changes on the EU, China and New Zealand (NZ) are 
then discussed. 
 
Developments in EU agriculture and environmental policy have both direct and 
indirect implications for NZ. Although the importance of the EU as a market for NZ 
produce has diminished, it is still significant, accounting for 15 per cent of NZ‟s 
exports, particularly in high value products and commodities such as sheep meat and 
dairy products (MFAT 2002). Direct impacts of changes in trade policy may affect 
NZ‟s access into the EU, particularly under preferential arrangements. Indirect 
impacts include the influence the EU has on the outcome of WTO negotiations, 
particularly in relation to agriculture.  Policy and market changes in the EU also 
affect NZ indirectly by impacting on other potential export markets.  Additionally, 
China has recently become a member of the WTO, which may also change the 
dynamics of agricultural trade.  The potential competition from China in terms of 
agricultural commodities as well as its potential as an export destination for NZ is an 
important consideration. 
 
 
  
Trade Policy Reform 
 
WTO Negotiations 
The current WTO round of negotiations was relaunched at Doha in November 2001.  
These negotiations covered a number of important factors, especially in relation to 
the reduction in export subsidies, the improving of market access, the rules for 
domestic subsidies as well as the technical grounds for restricting trade.  The further 
removal / reduction in export subsides and improving market access will not be 
without controversy and negotiation, however both the EU and the US have agreed 
to this in principle and began the process under the last round and subsequent policy 
changes.  The rules governing compensation payments as well as the technical 
barriers to trade which are expected to be the most controversial areas of negotiation 
between the EU and the US.  However, the EU/US trade pact, announced in August 
2003, shows willingness to negotiate despite the criticism from other countries that 
this pact contains little detail and may not meet demands of certain groups, notably 
the Cairns group (Agra Europe 2003). 
 
Negotiations towards achieving the objectives of trade liberalisation under the Doha 
Declaration of November 2001 are still underway.  The final deadline for completing 
the negotiations under the Doha declaration was January 1
st
, 2005, however this 
deadline has been postponed, without a new date being set. 
 
The Doha Declaration builds on work already undertaken in the previous agriculture 
negotiations, confirms and elaborates the objectives, as well as sets a timetable.  As 
mentioned above, member states have committed themselves to comprehensive 
negotiations aimed at: 
 Market access: substantial reductions 
 Export subsidies: reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of these 
 Domestic support: substantial reductions for support that distorts trade (WTO 
2004). 
 
The modalities programme aims to set targets for achieving the objectives set out in 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  Members failed to achieve the 31 March 2003 
deadline for these modalities, but agreed on a framework in the decision of July 
2004, now officially document WT/L/579.  Annex A, the “Framework for 
Establishing Modalities in Agriculture” outlines the key features of the modalities, 
without going into detail.  This agreement is now the working document before the 
negotiators.  The main features of the agreement, for the three “pillars” of the Doha 
Round, are described below: 
 
Export subsidies 
There were a number of proposals for dealing with export subsidies, with some 
countries proposing the total elimination of all forms of export subsidies, while 
others were prepared to negotiate further progressive reductions without total 
elimination.  One proposal involved a 50 percent reduction as an immediate down-
payment, followed by an elimination of subsidies completely in three years (for 
developed countries) or six years (for developing countries).  Another proposal was 
similar, however included greater flexibility for developing countries.  An alternative 
 to this type of proposal had more moderate reductions in some products, balanced by 
steeper reductions on other products, without eliminating export subsidies.    
 
The draft modalities decision on export subsidies, agreed on by the WTO in July 
2004, is based on the proposals from different countries and proposes an elimination 
at two speeds: in five years (ten years for developing countries) for one set of 
products, and nine years (12 years for developing countries) for the remaining 
products (WTO 2004).                  
 
Market Access 
Since the Uruguay Round (UR), discussion on market access has tended to focus on 
two main issues: the high levels of tariffs outside quotas, and the quotas themselves.  
The discussions in the modalities phase cover six main areas: tariffs; tariff quotas; 
tariff quota administration; special safeguards; importing state trading enterprises, 
and other issues.  The two areas of interest for this paper are tariffs and tariff quotas. 
 
Two general proposals have emerged for tariff reductions.  The first is known as the 
“Uruguay Round approach” and would follow the formula of the UR negotiations, 
which used an average linear reduction over all products, allowing some variation 
within this, providing a minimum reduction was met.  Supporters of this approach 
claim it is simple and flexible, while opponents doubt it would produce significant 
improvement in market access, and would not deal with tariff peaks and escalation. 
 
The “Swiss formula” approach envisages a flat rate percentage reduction for all 
products, with additional “non-linear” reductions on higher tariffs, expanding quotas 
and special treatment for developing countries.  This would produce much steeper 
cuts on higher tariffs.  Critics of this approach claim it would be too ambitious, 
would require too much adjustment, would be too complicated and could be 
inequitable. 
                                                                                                                                    
The draft modalities approach suggests a compromise between the two approaches 
described above.  The proposal for developed countries is shown in table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Developed Countries: Three Bands of Tariff Rates, Cut Over 5 Years 
 
Tariff Rate Average cut minimum cut for any product 
90%+ 60% 45% 
15 – 90% 50% 35% 
0-15 % 40% 25% 
        
Source: WTO 2004 
               
The revised first draft modalities on tariff quotas proposes expanding the tariff quota 
volumes to 10 percent of domestic consumption for developed countries over five 
years, with no obligation to reduce in-quota duties  (with some exceptions).  The 
draft also proposes some flexibility, in that one quarter of total tariff quota is allowed 
to increase to only eight percent, providing another quarter is increased to 12 percent.                
 
 
 
 Domestic Support 
The Amber Box consists of those measures which are considered to distort 
production and trade.  The revised first draft modalities on aggregate measurement of 
support (AMS) would be reduced from final bound levels by 60 percent over five 
years.  Developed countries de minimus levels of support would be halved from five 
percent of agricultural production to 2.5 percent over five years. 
 
Green Box subsides are those which cause minimal trade distortion, and must not 
involve price support.  They include environmental protection and regional 
development programmes.  It was proposed that the Green Box would be maintained, 
with possible amendments such as adding fixed or unchanging reference periods, 
tightening rules on criteria for compensation that is allowed in the Green Box, and 
allowing compensation for increased costs of protecting animal welfare. 
 
The blue box is an exemption from the general rule that all subsidies linked to 
production must be reduced or kept within de minimis levels, such as payments 
directly linked to animal numbers or acreage.  Under the current first draft on the 
Blue Box, current payments would be capped and bound.  They would then either be 
halved over five years, or merged into the Amber Box (WTO 2004).  The new 
agreement would cap Blue Box payments at five percent of the total value of each 
country‟s agricultural production (Agra Europe August 13, 2004). 
 
It was agreed that overall domestic support ceilings (AMS plus Blue Box and de 
minimus subsidies, would be reduced by 20 percent in the first year of the agreement 
(Agra Europe August 6, 2004).  
 
A reasonable outcome is expected for export subsidies (i.e. their elimination in the 
not-too-distant future).  The outcome on domestic subsidies may also be reasonable, 
depending on the definitions and loopholes countries negotiate. However there is 
unlikely to be any movement on market access, which is where the greatest 
economic and welfare gains are to be made (Anderson and Martin 2005). 
 
CAP Reform 
Alongside WTO reform, the EU is continuing with the reform of the CAP.  There 
were various reforms to the CAP, on a piece meal basis, over the 1980s.  
However, it was the McSharry reforms in 1992 which formed the base for future 
reform.  Whilst these left the basic price structure in place they reduced fixed 
prices for cereals to, or closer to, world market levels and compensated producers 
with direct payments, as illustrated in table 2. 
 
The next set of reforms was Agenda 2000.  This was radical in that it not only 
dealt with price cuts and detailed CAP policy but also the future financing of the 
CAP, the structure of funds, EU enlargement; and most importantly it replaced 
the original objectives of the CAP with a set of objectives for a rural policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2:  EU Prices and Subsidies in the Cereal, Dairy, and Beef Regimes under 
the McSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms 
 
 
 
Mc Sharry 
Reforms 
Agenda 2000 
Cereal prices 119.19 ecu/t 101.31 ecu/t 
Arable area payments 54.34 ecu/t 63 ecu/t 
Beef prices 2780 ecu/t 2224 ecu/t 
Suckler cow premium 145 ecu/head 200 ecu/head 
Special beef premium   
Bulls 135 ecu/head 210 ecu/head 
Steers  109 ecu/head 150 ecu/head 
 Cattle Slaughter premium 
>8months 
 80  ecu/ head 
< 8 months old  50 ecu/head 
Dairy  
Intervention price – butter 
- SMP 
 
 
 
2789.7 ecu/tonne 
1746.9 ecu/tonne 
Dairy cow premium  17.24 ecu 
Production Quota  Quota increase 
by 2.39% 
Source: Agra Europe: various issues. 
 
As shown in table 2, the Agenda 2000 reform built on the McSharry reforms, with 
further cuts in price and increases in direct payments.  The new initiatives 
introduced under Agenda 2000, which provided the foundation for more radical 
reform, included the introduction of a rural policy under the agriculture 
directorate.   
 
The most radical change in Agenda 2000 reforms was the removal of the 
production-oriented objectives of agricultural policy established in the Treaty of 
Rome and their replacement with objectives for a rural policy.   
 
The Agenda 2000 reforms were then followed by the Mid–Term Review of the 
CAP in 2002.  Under the Mid-Term Review, cereal and dairy prices were cut 
further, with a corresponding increase in direct payments, building again upon the 
principle of the McSharry reforms.  However, the Mid-Term Review (MTR) also 
included other changes, such as entitlement to direct payments being conditional 
on cross compliance, including needing to meet legislative obligations as well as 
good farming practice.  The Mid-Term Review also strengthened policies 
encouraging food quality and animal welfare.   
 
The latest changes to the MTR are the Luxembourg, or Fischler reforms of 2003.  
These reforms do reinforce, and in some cases increase, the price cuts agreed 
initially in the MTR.  Thus it was proposed to further reduce cereal prices by 5 
per cent, however this proposal was not adopted. Skim Milk Powder prices are to 
be cut by 15 per cent and butter by 25 per cent and there is to be an increase in the 
milk production quota of 1.5 per cent per year in 2004, 2005 and 2006.  
  
The major part of the Fischler reforms is the introduction of a Single Farm 
Payment Scheme (SPS), to replace all the direct hectarage and headage payments.  
This is predicted to involve a transfer of funds of 9 billion ecu between 2005 and 
2013. Whilst the details of how this will be achieved are yet to be determined, and 
will also vary across countries, it does potentially decouple support even further.  
The degree of decoupling will vary across countries, and the SFP does depend 
upon certain environmental, food safety, animal and plant health and welfare 
standards being met.   
 
The actual implementation of the SFP is very complex, with each country 
choosing its own implementation.  It seems that no two states will apply the same 
scheme and in the case of the UK, the four countries may adopt different schemes 
(Swinbank 2005).   There are two main ways the SPS can vary.  This first is 
partial decoupling to avoid desertification. Thus in France and Spain 25 per cent 
of payment are attached to arable aid, in Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal and 
Spain 100 per cent of suckler cow premiums and in Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal 50 per cent of ewe premiums paid are tied to 
production (Agra Europe 2004).   Secondly, the payments can be regionalised so 
the amount of money which the farms in a region could be entitled to can be 
pooled at regional level and a flat rate payment paid across all the land.  Or, some 
combination of the two can apply, for example in England 10 per cent is to be 
regional, rising to 100 per cent in 2012; in Northern Ireland, Sweden, Denmark 
and Luxembourg there will be a combination of the two schemes with no 
transition (Agra Europe 2004). 
 
The impact of all these reforms, and changes elsewhere in the EU, has reduced 
the importance of the CAP in the EU.  The CAP now only takes around 45 per 
cent of the EU budget, compared to 90 per cent in 1970. However, the level of 
taxpayer support given to agricultural commodities is still considerable at a 
proposed 43.613 billion ecu in 2005, with an additional 6.841 on rural 
development and transitional arrangements, although the extra cost to consumers 
has been reduced (Agra Europe 2003).  Market support has thus fallen from 91 
per cent of the total in 1986 – 88 to 61 per cent in 2000 - 02, while area/headage 
payments rose from 2.8 per cent in 1986-88 to 27.3 per cent in 2000 - 02, (Agra 
Europe 2004).   
 
How these changes affect and are affected by the current WTO negotiations has 
yet to be seen.  As stated in section 2.1, the current WTO negotiations propose a 
ceiling on domestic support.  It will be controversial whether the single farm 
payment is blue or green box, with the EU arguing that the change in systems 
shifts the payments from the blue box into the green box.  However, the details 
have yet to be worked through.  In addition, there are calls from Australia and the 
G-20 countries for the definition of the green box to be challenged to ensure 
payments are genuinely decoupled and do not encourage farmers to produce more 
(Agra Europe 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3:EU support levels for selected products 1986-88 and 2001/02 billion ecu 
 
 1986-88 base 
EU 12 
AMS 2001/02 
 EU 15 
Blue Box 
2001/02 EU 
15 
Cereals 20117 3659 13648 
Sugar 5266 5732  
Dairy 8145 5814  
Beef 18485 9709 5028 
Sheepmeat 918   
 
 
The framework agreement between the EU and the US commits members to blue 
box payments of no more than five per cent of the value of farm production (this 
would restrict EU blue box payments to around 12 billion ecu).   Under current 
proposals if the SFP is defined as green box this should not be an issue for the 
EU, with the EU claiming it will transfer close to 90 per cent of blue box 
payments into the green box, (Agra Europe 2004).  Also the agreement included a 
reduction in the Aggregate measure of Support by 60 per cent over 5 years, with 
specific ceilings on support for specific products.  Again, given the base year, this 
is not anticipated to be a problem for the EU, for example in 2001/2 the AMS was 
39.3 billion ecu which was well under the ceiling of 63.1 billion ecu (Agra 
Europe 2005).  However, this will become more problematic if the commitment 
on the framework agreement is held that product specific AMSs are capped at 
their respective average levels.  This will certainly affect the EU sugar regime.  
The total budget for the CAP is to be a maximum 42.293 billion ecu in 2013 with 
only 3.6 billion ecu for market support (Agra Europe 2004) 
 
 
Table 4:  The EU‟s level of support broken down into its commitment, declared 
and blue and green boxes. (Million ecus) 
 
 AMS 
Commitment 
AMS 
Declared 
Blue 
Box 
Green 
Box 
Blue box 
as % of 
agricultural 
production 
1995/6 78672 50026 20845 18779 10.1 
1996/7 76369 51009 21520 22130 9.8 
1997/8 74067 50194 20442 18166 9.4 
1998/9 71765 46683 20503 19168 9.6 
1999/0 69463 47885 19792 19930 8.5 
2000/1 67159 43654 22222 21844 9.1 
2001/2 67159 39281 23725 20661 9.6 
Source: Swinbank (2005) 
 
The other pressures for reform that the EU faces are of course its commitments 
under WTO export constraints.  In general these are not seen to be constraining 
for most commodities, with the exception of rice, sugar, wine, and fresh fruit and 
vegetables.  The problems with sugar and rice regimes are being addressed under 
current reforms, with proposed cuts in the sugar intervention price from 632 ecu 
 to 421 ecu equivalent to a 50 per cent cut in MFN (Most Favoured Nation) tariff 
(Swinbank 2005).  In the case of rice, again a 50 per cent cut in intervention price 
is proposed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
It must be emphasized that EU agriculture will receive some form of assistance 
for the foreseeable future. The direct payments seem to be the most likely form 
this will take.  However how these will be designed to meet green box 
requirements will be a matter of considerable interest.   
 
Under the Uruguay agreement the most likely justification for these, over the 
long-term, are as direct payments for environmental reasons, as defined in Annex 
2 of the agreement.  That is, payments to farmers must be based upon extra costs, 
or loss of income involved, from environmentally friendly farming methods, the 
current basis for payments under the agri-environmental schemes.  This would 
meet a number of EU policy objectives such as helping to maintain farm incomes, 
reducing environmental damage and increasing positive externalities from 
agriculture, as well as meeting international obligations. 
 
China’s WTO Accession  
China‟s trade policy has typically been characterised by promoting exports while 
protecting its domestic market and China has historically maintained tight state 
control over agricultural trade to control the flow of imports.  However, in 1986 
China applied to join GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), (GATT was 
replaced by the WTO in 1995), and from 1995-1997 cut import duties on many 
goods
1
 but maintained high tariffs on others, particularly agricultural products. 
 
After 13 years of negotiations, the US and China agreed to the terms for China‟s 
entry into the WTO in Beijing on 15 November 1999 (Agricultural Outlook 2000).  
The US and China also agreed on a bilateral trade deal under which China was to 
reduce trade-distorting barriers and practices that fell into three main categories: non-
tariff trade barriers, domestic agricultural support, and export subsidies (Tuan and 
Hsu 2001).  In addition, China committed to establish tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs) for 
wheat, rice, corn, cotton and soybean oil with gradually increasing quota levels, 
mostly over the same period. 
 
China joined the WTO in 2001 with commitments to further reduce trade distorting 
support, especially in the case of agriculture. As a consequence, China agreed to 
eliminate export subsidies for farm products and to cap trade-distorting domestic 
farm subsidies.  China also agreed to eliminate sanitary and phytosanitary barriers to 
agricultural imports not based on scientific evidence (Tuan and Hsu 2001). The 
commitments on market access are to lower tariffs of all agricultural products, 
remove quantitative restrictions on commodities and increase access to China‟s 
markets through tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for some commodities. 
 
Various sectors are predicted to benefit from China‟s WTO membership, especially 
the textiles-apparel sector in China. Some food and agricultural industries are also 
                                                 
1
 Prior to WTO accession, China never published complete import quota regulations or a description 
of its import quota system (Tuan and Hsu 2001). 
 
 
 predicted to benefit from the fall in the agricultural import costs.  The sectors 
predicted to lose are the producers of cereals and other major crops, due to the strong 
expansion of imports, together with most mechanical industries (CEPII 2000). The 
expansion of trade between 1999-2005 is likely to be faster under accession than 
with no accession (50 percent growth versus 25 percent). 
 
Literature Review 
 
There are a number of relatively recent studies analysing the impact of either CAP 
reform or WTO proposed reforms, or both, on the agricultural sectors of countries 
and regions around the world. These will be reviewed here briefly in order to provide 
comparison with the analysis in this paper.  Few of the studies include NZ 
specifically, and if they do, the agricultural sector is generally at a high level of 
aggregation. Rae and Strutt (2004) simulate some Doha Round proposals and do look 
at the effect on NZ, however the focus of the paper is on environmental results and 
they do not provide a detailed analysis of the trade impacts on NZ.   
 
Anderson and Martin (2005) examine the extent to which the world as a whole, and 
various regions, could gain from multilateral trade reform over the next decade.  
They use the GE model GTAP‟s database, amended to account for key protection 
changes to early 2005, integrated with the World Bank‟s economy-wide Linkage 
model.  Anderson and Martin (2005) address a number of questions, relating to the 
Doha round and the consequences of alternative proposals.   
 
The authors find that the potential gains from further global trade reform are huge in 
terms of global welfare, with developing countries gaining disproportionately from 
further global trade reform.  They also state that agriculture is where the cuts are 
needed the most, because of the high rates of assistance in that sector relative to 
others.  Subsidy disciplines are important, but Anderson and Martin (2005) find that 
increased market access in agriculture is crucial.  They also state that outlawing 
agricultural export subsidies is the obvious first step, in order to bring agriculture 
into line with the basic GATT rule against such measures.  Domestic support 
bindings must be cut substantially, and agricultural tariff bindings must be cut so that 
genuine market opening can occur.  Anderson and Martin (2005) claim that the July 
Framework Agreement does not guarantee major gains from the Doha Development 
Agenda.  Even if an agreement is ultimately reached, it may only be very modest. 
 
Moreddu et al. (2004) evaluate the potential impact of the CAP reform on land use, 
extensification, welfare, market developments and the level and composition of 
support, using the OECD‟s AGLINK model.  Moreddu et al. (2004) find pastureland 
for beef cows increases by 16 percent by 2008, due to significant extensification.  
Dairy production increases with the increase in quota (the quota continues to bind), 
while the domestic butter price decreases by around seven percent.  Cheese prices are 
predicted to fall by around two percent, while cheese production would increase by 
about one percent. Milk producer prices would fall by 2.6 percent.   
 
Binfield et al. (2004) analyse the Luxembourg reforms of the CAP, and the European 
proposal for agriculture under the WTO.  The Luxembourg reform introduces a SFP, 
with the associated significant decoupling of payments from production.  The authors 
use a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector, focusing on the 
 EU-15.  The results from this analysis indicate that even if countries were to opt for 
the fullest possible degree of re-coupling, the EU would still be able to agree to 
reductions in domestic support outlined in their submission on modalities, or in the 
joint US-EU proposal with little or no further reform of the CAP.  They find that the 
reforms are less likely to have an impact on export subsidy levels or market access.  
The reform is likely to further decrease the beef surplus, as beef cow numbers drop, 
and little impact on the dairy sector as the dairy quota remains in place.  The EU 
does remain vulnerable to changes in export subsidy limits in the dairy sector.   
 
Francois et al. (2003) explore the likely economic effects of the Doha WTO round 
for Europe and major developing regions, using a CGE model.  They simulate a 
linear liberalisation, where all trade instruments are reduced by 50 percent; a “Swiss 
formula” scenario, where the maximum import tariffs in agriculture and 
manufacturing are reduced by 25 percent; and finally a full elimination of all trade 
barriers.  The results show positive results globally and regionally for Europe, Africa 
and most of Asia, and particularly for Australia and New Zealand. Imports in the EU 
increase slightly faster than exports. 
 
Langley et al. (2003) examine the effects of policy changes on international dairy 
markets.  Their overall results indicate that liberalisation would reduce supplies, 
increase dairy trade, and raise world prices.  They use a PE model, adjusted to 
include the 2002 Farm Bill, and China‟s WTO accession.  The analysis consists of a 
total liberalisation scenario for dairy products only, and then a complete 
liberalisation of all agricultural products in their model.  They find that raw milk 
production increases in Australia and NZ by about 5-6 percent, with prices in those 
countries increasing by between 22 – 29 percent from the base in both scenarios.  
Dairy product prices decrease in the EU, by around 25 percent in both scenarios for 
butter and around six percent for cheese.  
 
Boumamra- Mechemache et al. (2002) use a spatial equilibrium model of the EU 
dairy sector to analyse the economic and welfare impacts of various liberalisation 
scenarios, all of which lead to sharp decreases in milk prices.   
 
In another analysis, Bureau et al. (2000) take the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture as a starting point and measure the liberalisation in agriculture that will 
take place by the EU and US by the end of the implementation period.  They 
compare the actual UR commitments with alternative schemes such as the “Swiss 
formula” and a uniform reduction in tariffs.   
 
Mechemache and Réquillart (2000) analyse the effects of dairy policy in the EU 
using a PE model taking into account the supply of milk, the processing stage, and 
the demand for processed products.  They compare the impact of Agenda 2000 with 
a reform involving a cut in export subsidies.  The authors claim that if the objective 
of the EU is to reduce the difference between EU and world prices, it is a better 
alternative to cut export subsidies rather than to increase the quota.  Their particular 
model is unable to evaluate the impact of quota liberalisation unfortunately. 
 
Shaw and Love (2001) examine the economic effects of two types of reform – 
increasing market access and reducing export subsidies, on world dairy trade.  They 
use the OECD‟s AGLINK partial equilibrium model.  Cox et al. (1999) and Zhu et 
 al. (1999) investigate the impact of the UR Agreement on world dairy prices, using a 
spatial equilibrium trade model. 
 
Methodology 
 
The Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM) is a partial equilibrium (PE) 
model based upon VORSIM (Roningen, 1986; Roningen et al., 1991), and focusing 
on the agricultural sector.  A detailed description of the LTEM and its characteristics 
are presented in Saunders and Cagatay (2003).  The LTEM includes 19 agricultural 
(7 crop and 12 livestock products) commodities and 17 countries. The commodities 
included in the model are treated as homogeneous with respect to the country of 
origin and destination and to the physical characteristics of the product. Therefore 
commodities are perfect substitutes in consumption in international markets. Based 
on these assumptions, the model is a non-spatial model, emphasising the net trade of 
commodities in each region.  
 
The LTEM is a synthetic model, with parameters adopted from the literature. The 
interdependencies between primary and processed products and/or between 
substitutes are reflected by cross-price elasticities which reflect the symmetry 
condition. Therefore own- and cross-price elasticities are consistent with the theory. 
The model is used to quantify the price, supply, demand and net trade effects of 
various policy changes. The medium- to long-term (until 2013) policy impacts are 
derived in a comparative static fashion based on the base year of 2000.  
 
In general there are six behavioural equations and one economic identity for each 
commodity under each country in the LTEM framework.  The behavioural equations 
are domestic supply, demand, stocks, domestic producer and consumer price 
functions and the trade price equation. The economic identity is the net trade 
equation, which is equal to excess supply or demand in the domestic economy. For 
some products the number of behavioural equations may change as the total demand 
is disaggregated into food, feed, and processing industry demand, and this demand is 
determined endogenously.  
 
The model solves by simulating the commodity based world market clearing price on 
the domestic quantities and prices, which may or may not be under the effect of 
policy changes, in each country. Excess domestic supply or demand in each country 
spills over onto the world market to determine world prices. The world market-
clearing price is determined at the level that equilibrates the total excess demand and 
supply of each commodity in the world market by using a non-linear optimisation 
algorithm (Newton‟s global or search algorithm).  
 
Dairy Sector: Behavioural Specifics and Policy Incorporation 
The dairy sector will be used as an example of the behavioural specification and 
policy incorporation in the LTEM as it is the most complex sector, however the 
concept can be applied to the other agricultural products in the model. 
 
Domestic Supply: In the LTEM framework a uniform Cobb-Douglas (CD) constant 
elasticity functional form is specified at the level of the variables to reflect the 
aggregate domestic supply response of each commodity in each country with respect 
to own- and cross-prices. Colman (1983) refers to this type of agricultural supply 
 response function, whose theoretical underpinnings are of an ad hoc nature (assumed 
to be derived from producers‟ profit maximization problem), as directly estimated 
partial supply response models. An agricultural commodity is assumed to be 
produced in a single farm and therefore the agricultural sector is treated as a single 
multi-product farm producing under perfect competition and producers are assumed 
to be price takers in the domestic market. The conditions that allow this exact 
aggregation are given in Moschini (1989).  
 
The dairy sector is modelled as five commodities, raw milk is defined as the farm 
gate product and is then allocated to the liquid milk, butter, cheese, whole milk 
powder (WMP) or skim milk powder (SMP) markets depending upon their relative 
prices subject to physical constraints. The domestic supply (qs) function for raw milk 
in region a (qsami) is shown in equation 1. Here, subscript m stands for the country, i 
shows raw milk and j is used to show substitute commodities such as beef and veal, 
and k shows feed products such as wheat, coarse grain and oil meals. The variables 
pp and pc represent the producer and consumer price level respectively. Therefore, 
domestic supply of raw milk is specified as a function of producer price for raw milk, 
beef, and consumer prices of feed inputs. Domestic supply is assumed to adjust 
simultaneously to price changes since there are no time lags involved in the 
behavioural equation. The own-price elasticity of supply is shown by the exponent 
ii and it is positive. The cross-price supply elasticity with respect to beef price (
ij
) 
and feed products (
ik
) are negative since raw milk and beef are assumed to be gross 
substitutes and feed products are the production inputs. The total domestic raw milk 
supply is equal to the sum of supply in regions a, b and c, equation 2.  
 
The domestic supply of dairy products (liquid milk, butter, cheese, skim and whole 
milk powder) is determined based on the raw milk production (qsmi) which reflects 
the physical constraint on processed dairy production, and producer prices of various 
dairy products. For example, in equation 3 domestic supply of liquid milk (qsml) is 
specified as a function of qsmi, producer price of liquid milk (ppml) and producer 
prices of other dairy products (ppmh). The exponentials li, ll and lh show the supply 
elasticity of liquid milk with respect to raw milk production, producer price of liquid 
milk and producer prices of other dairy products respectively.  
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h: butter, cheese, skim and whole milk powder 
i: raw milk 
j: beef and veal 
k: feed crops 
l: liquid milk 
 
In order to analyse the effects of land set-aside policy the supply function in the 
LTEM is respecified to include an exogenously determined shift factor which is 
given the value 1 initially, equation 4. The variable shfqs proxies the supply side shift 
factors which is commonly used in PE trade models such as GAP, GLS, 
 SPEL,WATSIM
2
. For example, if the pasture and grazed areas are reduced, by five 
percent for example, in order to quantify the effect of this reduction in the acreage on 
domestic supply the value of the shift factor is decreased by the same amount in 
order to simulate the downward shift in the supply curve, equation 5 
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Raw milk production quotas are incorporated exogenously during the simulation 
procedure by using a MIN function. For example if the amount of raw milk 
production in a country is limited by a maximum production quota amount, pqmi, 
then this quota amount can be introduced as a constraint in finding the equilibrium 
level of domestic supply during the mathematical solution procedure, equation 6. 
With this method the production quota amount becomes binding if the calculated 
equilibrium qsami is greater than the pqmi and the model is pushed to choose pqmi as 
the solution value. If the calculated equilibrium qsami is less than the pqmi then the 
model chooses the calculated qsami as the solution amount. 
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Domestic Demand. A uniform CD type aggregate domestic demand function is used 
in the LTEM framework for each commodity and country. The behavioural 
relationship is assumed to be derived from consumer‟s utility maximization problem 
(of an ad hoc nature) acting under perfect competition. Domestic demand is assumed 
to adjust simultaneously to price changes. The variables per capita income and 
population are exogenous to the model and the interdependencies between primary 
and processed products and/or between substitutes are reflected by cross-price 
elasticities.  
 
The domestic demand for raw milk is not modelled in the LTEM, instead the demand 
for dairy products are modelled endogenously at country level. The aggregate 
domestic demand relationship for dairy products is given by equation 7
3
. In this 
equation domestic demand for liquid milk, qdml is defined as a function of consumer 
prices of the own (pcml), substitute and complementary commodities (pcmh), per 
capita income (pincm) and population growth rate (popm). The exponents reflect the 
related elasticities. The cross-price demand elasticity (lh) with respect to the prices 
of other raw milk products are positive since these products are assumed to be gross 
substitutes with liquid milk. The elasticity of demand with respect to income (l2) 
and population growth (l3) is also expected to be positive. In order to analyse the 
effects of demand side shifters other than income and population growth, the demand 
function is respecified to include an exogenously determined shift factor (shfqm) 
which is given the value 1 initially, equation 8. 
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 See Salomon (1998a; b) for GAP, Tyers and Anderson (1986) for GLS, Henrichsmeyer (1990) for 
SPEL and Lampe (1998) for WATSIM models. 
3
 The demand for other dairy products (qdmh) other than liquid milk is specified by using the same 
functional form and the same behavioural relationships that are in qdml. 
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Stocks. The stocks are explicitly modelled in the LTEM framework based on the 
inventory demand theory (FAPRI 1989). The main determinant of the stock demand 
is the transaction motive, which responds to quantity of production or consumption, 
rather than speculative motives. In the dairy market it is assumed that raw milk is 
stocked in the form of butter, cheese and skim milk powder (in USA stock for whole 
milk powder is also allowed). Therefore, the behavioural equation for stock demand 
is given as in equation 9. In this equation hi represents the elasticity of stock 
demand with respect to quantity of supply and is assumed to be positive. 
 
hh
mhhmh qsqe

 0 ;  
0hh        (9) 
 
Net Trade. The net trade function for a commodity and country is defined as an 
economic identity which accounts for the difference between domestic supply and 
the sum of various demand amounts and stocks. Stocks are incorporated as change 
from previous year, qem, therefore it is the difference between ending stocks at time 
t-1 (which is the beginning stocks at time t) and estimated stocks at time t. (which is 
the ending stocks at time t). Since it is assumed that all produced raw milk is utilized 
in the form of processed products, raw milk is not traded. In equations 10 and 11 the 
net trade identity for the liquid milk and other dairy products are presented. 
 
mlmlml qdqsqt                    (10) 
mhmhmhmh qeqdqsqt                   (11) 
 
Prices. The domestic producer (ppm) and consumer prices (pcm) in the LTEM are 
determined by the trade price (ptm) of the related commodity and country, domestic 
and border policies that affect domestic prices (tpm and tcm) and transportation costs 
(tc). Equations 13 and 14 present this price transmission mechanism, which consists 
of protection, tpmh,l and tcmh,l, and stabilization (WDph,l/exm)

 components (Tyers and 
Anderson 1986), for liquid milk and other dairy products. The trade price of a 
commodity in a country is determined by the world market price of that commodity, 
equation 12. The variable exm is the nominal exchange rate and the parameter  
shows the price transmission elasticity. The price transmission elasticity shows how 
much a change in world prices is transmitted to the domestic market, which the effect 
is referred to as stabilization component. If a country for example is applying a fixed-
price policy for a certain commodity then  takes the value of 0, or instead if there is 
a completely free market policy then  equals 1
4
. When there are no policy measures 
that affect domestic prices (protection component is 0) and under the assumptions of 
no transportation costs and homogenous, perfectly substitutable products then the 
domestic producer and consumer prices are determined by stabilization component 
and defined as in equations 13 and 14. 
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 The  is assumed to be 1 for all dairy products in Australia, EU, New Zealand USA. 
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In the LTEM, various domestic producer and consumer support and subsidy 
measures in the dairy market are incorporated to the price transmission mechanism 
as ad-valorem distortions
5
 which form a price wedge between domestic and world 
prices. These measures include direct payments (sdmh,l), inputs subsidies (simh,l), 
general services expenditures (sgmh,l) and other market subsidy payments (smmh,l) 
to the producers and consumer market subsidy (cmmh,l). Border policies such as per 
unit import tariffs (or taxes) and export subsidies and taxes are also incorporated in 
the price transmission mechanism through the use of commodity based price wedge 
variables, tpmh,l and tcmh,l, which differentiate the domestic and trade price of the 
commodity. Equation 15 and 16 show the ppmh,l and pcmh,l which are extended with 
ad-valorem domestic and border policy measures.  
 
 
mimimimiimhimhimh smsgsisdtctpptpp  ,,,               (15) 
imhimhimhimh cmtctcptpc ,,,,                   (16) 
 
In the LTEM an intervention price policy applied in dairy market is incorporated in 
the solution procedure. The producer price function, which is specified as in equation 
15 before, is respecified here as in equation 17 by adding a MIN function. With this 
method the intervention price, mpmh,,l, becomes binding if the calculated equilibrium 
ppmh,l is greater than the mpmh,l and the model is pushed to choose mpmh,l as the 
solution value. If the calculated equilibrium ppmh,l is less than the mpmh,l then the 
model chooses the calculated ppmh,l as the solution price level. 
 
)),(( ,,,, lmhmimimimiimhimhimh mpsmsgsisdtctpptMINpp  ;  tc=0    (17) 
 
 
Scenarios 
 
Based on the previous discussion regarding WTO commitments, CAP reform, and 
China‟s accession to the WTO, a number of scenarios were simulated using the 
LTEM.  These are summarised in table 5 below, not including the base scenario, 
which assumes current policies and support measures remain in place.  All scenarios 
simulate from a base year of 2000 and continue out to 2013.  The first scenario 
represents the WTO proposal for elimination of export subsidies, beginning with an 
initial decrease of 50 percent in 2006 and eliminated over five years, for the dairy 
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As introduced in the methodology of producer and consumer subsidy equivalent (PSE and CSE) measures, 
Cahill and Legg (1990). 
 and livestock sectors in the EU and China, and a reduction of tariffs by the same 
amount.  The second scenario involves the CAP reform measure of increasing EU 
dairy quota, by 1.5 percent for three years beginning in 2005.  The third scenario 
simulates the previous one in conjunction with a reduction in minimum prices of 
butter and skim milk powder (SMP) in the EU, by 25 percent for butter (seven 
percent for three years and four in the final year, beginning in 2004), and 15 percent 
for SMP (five percent for three years beginning in 2004).   
 
The following two scenarios, four and five, aim to illustrate the difference between 
China joining the WTO and if it had not.  Scenario four therefore simulates a 
liberalisation of all countries in the model, beginning in 2005.  This assumes a 
complete removal of export subsidies and tariffs (however production quotas and 
intervention prices remain).  Scenario five supposes that China has not joined the 
WTO and simulates that all countries in the model again liberalise their trade, with 
the exception of China, who maintains its tariffs and export subsidies.  The final 
scenario, six, simulates China‟s market access commitments in dairy products and 
meat (beef and sheep), formally approved by the WTO in November 2001. China 
committed to reduce effective protection for dairy products and meat by varying 
amounts by January 2002 and even further by 2004.  Details of these policies are 
shown in table 5.  
 
 
Table 5.  Scenario description 
 
Scenario Policy Type Details 
1 WTO draft proposal Export subsidies and tariffs reduced by 
50% for beef, dairy and sheepmeat in 
China and the EU (in 2006), and 
eliminated over five years. 
2 CAP dairy quota increase Milk quota increased by 1.5% each year 
from 2006 - 2008 
3 Dairy quota increase + minimum price 
decreases 
The above plus: 
Butter – reduced by 7% each year from 
2004 – 2006; 4% in 2007 
SMP – reduced by 5% each year from 
2004 - 2007 
4 Full liberalisation Complete removal of all countries‟ 
export subsidies and tariffs in 2005 
5 Full liberalisation (pre-China joining 
WTO) 
Complete removal of all countries‟ 
export subsidies and tariffs in 2005, 
excluding China 
6 WTO tariff reductions for China Export subsidies and tariffs reduced by 
Butter-13.3% in 2001; 26.7% by 2005 
Cheese- 15.2% in 2001; 22.8% by 2005 
SMP- 35% in 2001; 5% by 2004 
WMP – 35% in 2001; 5% by 2004 
Beef – 21.8% in 2001; 11.2% by 2004 
Sheep – 0.2% in 2001; 4.8% by 2004 
 
 
 Results 
 
The model uses the year 2000 as the base year, and simulates out to 2013.  The 
results are presented and discussed as the differences between the base scenario in 
2013, and the results of the particular policy scenario simulated, in 2013.  Although 
results are produced for all countries and commodities in the model, selected 
commodities only will be discussed here (from the beef, sheep and dairy sectors), 
and only for the EU, NZ and China.  More detailed results are shown in Appendix 
tables 1 and 2.  The results are discussed by scenario below, and summarised results 
presented by country in table 6. 
 
Scenario One – WTO draft proposal 
 
The first scenario, which assumes that export subsidies and tariffs in the EU and 
China are reduced by 50 percent in 2006 and subsequently eliminated over five 
years, predicts an almost universal decrease in producer prices and production in the 
EU by the end of the simulation period, 2013, for livestock products.  The price 
reductions range from 9.3 percent for sheep meat, to 19.1 percent for WMP.   It 
should be noted that although the export subsidies and tariffs have been removed, the 
dairy production quota and intervention prices in the EU remain.  Production 
decreases are the most substantial in the beef sector (9.2 percent) and WMP (8.4 
percent), with smaller decreases in sheep meat and raw milk production.  Net trade in 
the EU is predicted to decrease across all the commodities of interest.  The EU 
switches from being a net exporter of beef, cheese and SMP to being a net importer 
of these products.  It is predicted to remain a net exporter of WMP, at a reduced 
amount, while it was already a net importer of sheep and butter in the base scenario.  
The EU is predicted to undergo a significant reduction in producer returns across the 
beef, sheep and dairy sectors.  Beef is the greatest loser, at 21 percent, however 
sheepmeat and raw milk producers‟ returns are also predicted to decrease by 12 and 
14 percent, respectively. 
 
The impact of the removal of export subsidies in the EU and China is predicted to 
lead to benefits for the NZ livestock sector.  Prices and production of all 
commodities increase.  The largest price increase is predicted for Cheese, of 13 
percent.  Exports also increase steadily, from between four percent for beef, to 12 
percent for cheese.  Producer returns increase for all products studied, from 8.4 
percent for beef to nearly 18 percent for sheepmeat.  
 
Rae and Strutt (2005) simulate various WTO reform scenarios in the form of tariff 
removals, and analyse the effects on NZ.  Their simulations are carried out in the 
general equilibrium model GTAP and therefore cover all sectors, but include less 
agricultural detail than here.  They do predict increases in export volumes of dairy 
products across their scenarios, however they also predict decreases in export 
volumes of other livestock products, as well as production of these products.  
 
The impact on China of removing its export subsidies, was for prices and production 
to decrease across the board.  Producer returns were predicted to fall for all sectors 
analysed, from 8.6 percent in the beef sector to just over two percent for raw milk. 
 
 Moreddu et al. (2003) simulate two CAP reform scenarios which involve converting 
existing payments under the CAP to a SFP.  Although the scenarios are different 
from the one here, the results show the same trend in the EU: a reduction in price and 
production from the base scenario. 
 
Scenario Two – EU Dairy quota increase   
 
The second scenario, which simulates an increase in dairy production quota in the 
EU, predicts a decrease in prices across the dairy sectors of not only the EU, but also 
China and NZ.  Prices of beef and sheep remain unchanged.  Production in the EU 
increases in the dairy sector as a result of the increase in production quota.  Beef 
production decreases slightly, while sheep production remains as in the base.  Trade 
of dairy products from the EU increases, with the exception of cheese, exports of 
which are predicted to reduce.  Producer returns change by less than one percent for 
EU producers however, because of the fall in producer prices.   
 
NZ and China are predicted to reduce their production of dairy products.  Sheep and 
beef production change only marginally.  Prices for agricultural commodities in NZ 
and China are also predicted to fall in this scenario.  Trade of all the commodities of 
interest increase in China, with the exception of WMP, while NZ exports of dairy 
products decrease.  Producer returns for both China and NZ are expected to fall 
following this increase in EU dairy quota (with the exception of beef prices in China 
which increase by 0.1 percent).  
 
These EU results may be compared with the Bouamra-Mechemache et al. (2002) 
study.  In one of their scenarios they simulate an increase in dairy quota by 5.3 
percent (this study simulates a total increase of 4.5 percent).  The impact on EU dairy 
prices is comparable between the studies, the only significant difference between that 
study and this one is in SMP, where they find a decrease in prices of 20 percent, 
whereas in this study it is only 3 percent.  Production increases are also comparable, 
they do have a greater disaggregation of dairy products however, the only major 
difference in production is in WMP where this study predicts an increase of six 
percent and their study 21 percent.  Net trade impacts are also relatively similar, 
given the differences in modelling strategy and assumptions. 
 
Scenario Three – Dairy quota increase combined with intervention price reductions 
 
The results from this scenario are exactly the same as the results from the previous 
scenario.  This is because the original minimum prices did not bind in either the base 
or the production quota increase scenario, so lowering these intervention prices has 
no effect. 
 
Scenario Four – All countries liberalise 
 
This scenario simulated a removal of all export subsides and tariffs in all countries in 
the model.  The results show a general decrease in prices in the EU.  Production is 
also predicted to decrease in the EU, for most commodities except raw milk, which 
remains at the quota level.  Net trade decreases for all the commodities analysed 
here, and producer returns are predicted to decrease across the sectors analysed here, 
ranging from four percent for raw milk to nearly 20 percent for beef. 
  
The effects on NZ are again positive.  Prices and production are both predicted to 
increase for all commodities here.  The increases in this scenario are the largest of 
any of the predicted changes simulated for this paper.  Net trade increases 
correspondingly across the commodities of interest, and again by the largest amounts 
of the simulations so far.  Producer returns increase therefore as well, from between 
14 percent for beef to 37 percent in the dairy sector. 
 
Although China also liberalises in this scenario, the effects on China are mixed. 
Prices for beef and sheep decrease, while dairy prices are predicted to increase.  The 
price increases are relatively minimal, although SMP is predicted to increase by 11.9 
percent.  Production also increases in the dairy sector, but decreases in beef and 
sheep.  The increases in production are relatively minor, again SMP production is the 
exception, at 12.5 percent.  Net trade increases for cheese and the milk powders.  
Trade in butter is predicted to decrease slightly, while sheep and beef trade decreases 
considerably.  Producer returns in this scenario are predicted to increase in the dairy 
sector, but fall in the sheep and beef sectors (by 4.5 and 5.4 percent respectively). 
 
Binfield et al. (2004) simulate a SFP under different dates of implementation.  Their 
results are similar for the dairy sector as the results discussed here, but prices for beef 
and sheepmeat increase in their simulations.  Langley et al. (2003) find relatively 
similar changes to this study following an international liberalisation of agricultural 
markets.  Their predictions for price increases in NZ are generally significantly larger 
than this study, while the price changes in the EU are of a more comparable 
magnitude, with the exception of SMP price, which they predict to increase by six 
percent (compared with a decrease of four percent in this study).  
 
Scenario Five – All countries liberalise, excluding China 
 
This scenario assumes that China has not yet joined the WTO and thus is not 
obligated to liberalise its tariffs and export subsidies.  Therefore all other countries in 
the model liberalise, while China does not.  This situation does not have a significant 
impact on the EU, that is, the changes are not markedly different from the previous 
scenario where China also liberalised.  The general trend in this scenario is that the 
changes in the EU are of a slightly greater magnitude than in the previous scenario, 
with the exception of sheepmeat, whose price and production levels differ by greater 
amounts than other commodities to the previous scenario.   
 
The effect this scenario has on NZ is to slightly dampen the increases in price, 
quantity and net trade, in comparison with the previous scenario, particularly in the 
beef and sheepmeat sectors.  The effect on the dairy sector is very minor.  Producer 
returns for NZ, although considerably higher than in the base scenario, are less than 
the returns from the previous scenario, particularly for sheepmeat.   Sheepmeat 
undergoes the largest change between the two liberalisation scenarios in both NZ and 
the EU. 
 
China clearly benefits the most from this situation.  Prices increase for all the 
commodities of interest, from 1.6 percent for liquid milk, to around 20 percent for 
both cheese and SMP.  Production increases in general, although sheep and beef 
production do not increase significantly.  Net trade increases for all of these 
 commodities, with both butter and cheese changing from net importing to net 
exporting.   
 
Scenario Six – China implements its WTO commitments 
 
This scenario predicts general decreases in producer prices, production and trade in 
China in comparison with the base scenario.  Scenario six predicts the impacts in 
2013 of China‟s commitments in order to gain accession to the WTO.  Price 
decreases are predicted to range from 1.2 percent for liquid milk to nearly nine 
percent for cheese, while production is predicted to decrease by similar amounts.  
Producer returns decrease across the three sectors, by around five percent for both 
beef and milk, and seven percent for sheepmeat. 
 
The effect this scenario is predicted to have on the EU and NZ is positive, but by 
relatively minor amounts. Producer returns in the EU increase by less than one 
percent in the dairy sector and 4.5 percent for sheepmeat. NZ sheepmeat producers 
are expected to gain the most, with an increase in returns of nearly seven percent.  
Dairy returns in NZ, similarly to the EU, are also only predicted to increase by less 
than one percent, with beef returns increasing by two percent.  Net trade effects in 
these countries are also positive but very minor. 
 
Table 6. Change in producer returns between base and scenario, in 2013 for China, 
EU and NZ 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The removal of export subsidies as proposed in the WTO framework would clearly 
benefit a country such as NZ.  Producers in the EU and other heavily supported 
countries would be negatively affected, however the introduction of decoupled 
support such as the SFP would help to offset these reductions.  A country such as 
China is predicted to be affected by smaller amounts, depending on the sector.   
 
The CAP reform of the production quota (scenario 2) also has mixed impacts.  In 
terms of producer returns, the impacts on the EU are minimal.  Impacts on other 
countries vary, interestingly the dairy sector in NZ is reasonably significantly 
  China 
 scenario 1 2 4 5 6 
Beef -8.6 0.1 -5.4 6.3 -5.0 
Sheep -5.3 0.0 -4.5 6.5 -7.2 
Raw milk -2.1 -2.7 2.7 10.3 -5.1 
  EU 
Beef -21.3 -0.6 -19.9 -20.1 1.0 
Sheep -12.4 0.1 -11.5 -16.9 4.5 
Raw milk -14.5 0.4 -4.2 -4.5 0.4 
  NZ 
Beef 8.4 -0.7 13.9 10.2 2.3 
Sheep 18 -0.1 20.4 11.2 6.9 
Raw milk 17.1 -6.5 37.4 36.3 0.9 
 affected.  As mentioned previously, if the production quota reform is introduced 
concurrently with the removal of export subsidies and tariffs, the increase in quota is 
not filled and the effect is the same as the export subsidy phasing out scenario. 
 
Scenarios four, five and six highlight the effect of China having joined the WTO.  
With China liberalising its trade completely, at the same time as all other countries in 
the model, as in scenario four, NZ‟s profits increase, and the decreases experienced 
in the EU are slightly less when China is in the WTO than when it is not.  For China, 
while the gains from being in the WTO (scenario five) are certainly less than if they 
were not committed to liberalising, their prices and production of some commodities 
(particularly dairy) still increase above the baseline as they take advantage of the 
liberalisation occurring in other countries.  Scenario six highlights the effect of 
China‟s commitments as part of its accession to the WTO, assuming that trade 
policies in other countries do not change.  The effect on China is negative, however 
the EU and NZ do benefit from this, particularly in the sheep sectors of these 
countries. 
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 APPENDIX TABLE ONE – PERCENTAGE CHANGES BETWEEN BASE AND SCENARIOS IN 2013 FOR CHINA, EU AND NZ 
    Export subsidies 
reduced 
EU dairy quota increase All countries fully 
liberalise 
All countries fully 
liberalise except china 
WTO tariff reductions in 
China for dairy products 
and meat. 
    China EU NZ China EU NZ China EU NZ China EU NZ China EU NZ 
producer 
prices 
beef -5.9 -13.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.8 -13.3 7.2 4.2 -13.3 4.7 -3.5 0.6 1.7 
(% change) sheep -4.6 -9.3 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.8 -8.5 10.8 5.2 -12.5 6.0 -5.6 3.2 3.8 
  raw 
milk 
-1.5 -14.0 9.0 -1.7 -4.0 -3.6 1.5 -4.2 18.6 6.5 -4.5 18.3 -3.4 0.4 0.4 
  liquid 
milk 
-0.9 -19.9 -5.1 -0.2 -5.7 2.2 -0.1 -2.2 -10.8 1.6 -2.3 -10.4 -1.2 0.2 -0.4 
  butter -7.5 -15.9 8.5 -2.6 -2.3 -3.0 1.8 -7.4 19.4 16.4 -7.8 19.1 -8.8 0.5 0.4 
  cheese -2.4 -11.0 13.3 -4.2 -3.9 -4.9 5.9 -3.5 22.9 19.3 -3.9 22.4 -8.9 0.5 0.7 
  WMP -4.4 -19.1 7.8 -2.8 -2.3 -3.1 1.2 -14.4 14.1 11.9 -14.9 13.4 -7.0 0.4 0.6 
  SMP -1.7 -16.0 7.4 -3.8 -3.3 -4.2 11.9 -4.4 22.3 20.3 -4.5 22.2 -5.6 0.0 0.0 
quantity 
produced 
beef -2.9 -9.2 3.4 0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -1.7 -7.6 6.3 2.0 -7.9 5.3 -1.6 0.4 0.6 
 (% change) sheep -0.7 -3.4 7.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -3.3 8.7 1.2 -5.0 4.9 -1.6 1.3 3.0 
  raw 
milk 
-0.7 -0.6 7.4 -1.0 4.5 -2.9 1.2 0.0 15.8 3.6 0.0 15.2 -1.8 0.0 0.5 
  liquid 
milk 
0.0 -5.5 1.1 -0.1 3.0 -0.4 0.1 1.1 2.3 0.1 1.1 2.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 
  butter -4.4 -3.2 8.4 -1.1 5.6 -3.3 1.1 -2.8 18.8 7.9 -2.9 18.2 -4.2 0.1 0.5 
  cheese -2.0 -0.4 9.2 -4.0 4.1 -3.6 5.5 0.0 18.8 17.4 0.0 18.2 -8.0 0.1 0.6 
  WMP -4.2 -8.4 8.4 -3.1 6.2 -3.3 1.7 -12.8 17.6 12.7 -13.2 16.9 -7.2 0.1 0.6 
  SMP -5.9 -3.2 8.4 -4.7 5.6 -3.3 12.5 -2.8 18.8 28.6 -2.9 18.2 -9.3 0.1 0.5 
producer 
returns 
beef -8.6 -21.3 8.4 0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -5.4 -19.9 13.9 6.3 -20.1 10.2 -5.0 1.0 2.3 
(% change) sheep -5.3 -12.4 18.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -4.5 -11.5 20.4 6.5 -16.9 11.2 -7.2 4.5 6.9 
  raw 
milk 
-2.1 -14.5 17.1 -2.7 0.4 -6.5 2.7 -4.2 37.4 10.3 -4.5 36.3 -5.1 0.4 0.9 
 APPENDIX TABLE TWO – CHANGES IN NET TRADE BETWEEN BASE AND SCENARIOS IN 2013. 
 
     Base scenario Export subsidies 
reduced 
EU dairy quota 
increase 
All countries fully 
liberalise 
All countries fully 
liberalise except China 
WTO tariff reductions 
in China for dairy 
products and meat 
    China  EU NZ China EU NZ China  EU NZ China  EU NZ China  EU NZ China  EU NZ 
net trade beef -2766 766 558 -3567 -134 580 -3355 766 562 -3403 -16 601 -2499 -100 595 -3355 766 562 
(000 
tonnes) 
sheep -283 -200 503 -383 -351 555 -438 -147 524 -373 -343 563 -158 -428 538 -438 -147 524 
  butter -18 -130 380 -33 -322 416 -35 -125 382 -19 -235 460 1 -242 458 -35 -125 382 
  cheese -8 80 301 -20 -283 337 -50 102 303 15 0 375 69 -17 373 -50 102 303 
  WMP 27 433 446 21 322 483 16 435 448 29 290 524 45 286 521 16 435 448 
  SMP 4 60 302 3 -28 328 1 61 303 9 23 360 13 22 358 1 61 303 
 
 
